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Small Wars, Big Defense:
Living in a World of Lower Tensions
Murray Weidenbaum
National policies for the 1990s - both for
military and civilian needs must be
developed for a world that is vastly different
from the past.
It has become clear that
decisions affecting war and peace cannot be
made in isolation from the civilian economy.
The willingness as well as the ability of a
nation to support military preparedness is determined by the complex interaction of a host
of factors - domestic and international, political, economic, and social. After all, the collapse of the Soviet Bloc Is Warsaw Pact did not
result from military action.
The events since 1989 - at home and
abroad- reenforce the need for a "new look"
by the United States in setting national military
strategy. Moreover, the way that national security policy is carried out strongly affects the
civilian economy.
The history of the past half century shows
frequent start-and-stop cycles of defense
spending. Those wasteful alternations often
occurred as a result of hasty responses to dimly
perceived changes in our national security position.
On the positive side, it makes good sense to
cooperate with the Russians to cut back on the
size of both military establishments. Yet the
United States should be prepared to reverse
course for a variety of reasons. Parts of the
former Soviet Union Is arsenal may fall into the
hands of terrorist groups. Alternatively, a new
Russian leadership could take a more aggressive position. Moreover, serious military
Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished
University Professor and Director of the Center for
the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis. This study draws from his new
book, Small Wars, Big Defense (Oxford University
Press, 1992).
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threats may arise elsewhere, notably the Middle
East.
Effective reversibility requires a strong defense industrial base as well as alert and wellmotivated reserve components. Clearly, the
U.S. continues to live in a dangerous world,
even though the nature of the danger changes.

Adjusting to Lower Levels
of Defense Spending
The most reasonable basis on which to plan
our own national security is to expect continued
and substantial reductions in U.S. military
spending for at least five years. The cutbacks
will be more than the very modest 1-2 percent
annual declines experienced in the late 1980s.
Defense reductions of 5 percent a year or more
are likely. Another way of looking at it is that
a high level of military spending will continue
for the indefinite future, but it will be much
lower than peak rates experienced in the 1980s.
This substantial, but curtailed, level of defense outlay necessitates a variety of adjustments, mainly painful to the people directly involved. Yet, the general magnitude of the
change will be less (as a share of the GNP)
than was the case following the end of the Korean War or the Vietnam War.
Five key policy decisions need to be made
to facilitate these defense cutbacks. The longer
these decisions are delayed, the more difficult
the adjustments will be.
Reduce Military Programs
To fit within fiscal reality, President Bush
and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney have
to take those difficult actions that the Pentagon
has avoided since the mid-1980s
substantially reducing the number of aircraft,
missiles, and ships the Defense Department
buys and the number of people in uniform.
The mismatch between the military's wishes
and congressional appropriations can only be
resolved in one way - by cutting the planned
spending to fit the budget cloth.
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Coming to grips with the budgetary challenge also will reduce the great uncertainty that
currently hangs over planning in the defense
industry - an uncertainty that affects the businesses, their employees and families.
Some of the cuts that should be made are
obvious. It is only bureaucratic inertia that has
blocked them. For example, the Navy is still
planning to spend $1 billion to build and outfit
a series of additional "home ports" original I y
designed to support a 600-ship fleet.

The mismatch between the military's
wishes and congressional appropriations
can only be resolved in one way by cutting the planned spending
to fit the budget cloth.
The current fleet is less than 500 ships and
further reductions are clearly in the cards. The
support for continuing this expensive and
needless effort comes from the cities where the
new ports are scheduled to be built. We must
be on our guard against born-again military
enthusiasts. Local interest groups find it easy
to confuse pork with patriotism. Do you want
to convert a congressional dove to a hawk?
Easy, just try cancelling a defense contract in
his or her district.
In voting lower appropriations for defense,
the Congress should avoid setting in motion a
new stop-and-go cycle in military spending.
Serious threats to the national security are
changing in form but they surely continue whether in the Middle East or elsewhere (such
as the nuclear buildup of North Korea).
Visions of peace dividends should not obscure the need to maintain an adequate corps of
professionals in the armed forces and key reserve units. While serving on the President's
Military Manpower Commission in 1981-82, I
learned what it takes to attract a quality military force without bringing back the draft: pay
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and perks at levels competitive with the civilian
economy.
The effectiveness of the large
amounts of money and resources devoted to defense will be enhanced by lowering the peaks in
the military budget and raising the valleys.
Maintain the Social Safety Net
There is a great deal of uncertainty and considerable fear in many localities concerning the
future of the employees at defense plants and
military installations. Yet, the most likely
outlook is for the great majority of the people
involved to keep their current jobs. Defense
spending is going to continue at a high level,
albeit much lower than now.
Significant increases in unemployment are
occurring in centers of defense production.
More layoffs are expected. Being told by your
employer that you no longer have a job, especially if you have worked for that company for
a long period of time, is a traumatic experience.
Many of the people involved went straight
to work after graduation from high school or
college. Involuntary unemployment is a new
experience for them and often they are not even
aware of the public and private mechanisms already in place to help them with the search for
a new job and to provide some income to supplement the savings they have accumulated.
As a compassionate society, the United
States provides a great variety of help to people
caught in that situation. Experience with previous defense cutbacks tells us that the knowledge that the government and particularly the
community cares and is standing by to help is
very important to the newly unemployed.
Nevertheless, there is no justification for
providing special benefits to unemployed defense workers. They should be treated as generously as - but no more or less than people who lose their jobs because of sluggish
housing sales resulting from a change in the
government's monetary policy.
The scientists, engineers, and technicians
that constitute a large fraction of the defense
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industry do not need federal "make work" programs. They are among the most mobile members of the labor force - geographically, industrially, and occupationally. While defense
is a national problem, economic adjustment is
largely local. In any event, adjustment to defense cutbacks is best initiated in the private
sector.

Adjustment to defense cutbacks is best
initiated in the private sector.
Many defense-oriented communities take the
position that the nation owes them something
special because of their "contributions" to the
national defense. When we recall the vigorous
lobbying efforts those same communities made
to get the Pentagon to locate the defense contract in their locality in the first place, we must
dismiss such obviously self-serving views.
Government decision makers must learn to
refrain from jumping every time a constituent
gripes. The experience at Fort Wolters in central Texas furnishes a cogent case in point.
When the base closing was announced in 1973,
the Fort Worth Star-Telegram headlined the
story as "Economic Rape." Looking back
now, several thousand new jobs were created
by businesses moving into the base. The
current local reaction is very different. The
mayor of the nearby town, Mineral Wells, was
recently quoted as saying, "That post couldn't
be reactivated now. The people here wouldn't
stand for it. "
The unpleasant fact is that recessions (albeit
mild and short) followed the end of the Korean
and Vietnam Wars and have accompanied the
current defense cutback. The defense cutbacks
likely in the next several years are relatively
modest- a fraction of one percent of GNP in
any one year. We should rei y on the Federal
Reserve System to offset that economic void.
The Fed is the most effective mechanism for influencing short-term economic developments.

5

Neither of these fears - employment cuts
or recession - should deter the movement to a
lower level of defense spending. The prosperity of the United States does not require any
particular amount of military activity. The
productivity and competitiveness of the American economy will suffer if defense spending is
used to prop up the prosperity of any region or
industry.

Remove Government Obstacles

We need a viable group of experienced
companies and highly skilled people to meet
current defense needs and to provide a base for
expansion should the international outlook
worsen substantially. The major defense prime
contractors and subcontractors as a group also
constitute a key part of this nation's capability
for industrial innovation.

Maintain Support for R & D

Because the military is such a large promoter of science and technology, a reduction in
defense spending means a cutback in total federal support for research and development
(R&D). That curtailment of investment in science and technology is troublesome for reasons
that extend far beyond the military. Study after
study shows that R&D is a major contributor to
economic growth and rising living standards.
Moreover, the high-tech industries, which in
many cases are almost synonymous with the
major defense contractors, are unique in providing a surplus of exports over imports, year
after year.
There are some sensible things that government can do to shore up the high-technology
sectors without spending a lot of money. The
Department of Defense should reduce the barriers it has erected between defense and commercial technology. Greater consolidation of military and industrial product specifications would
be especially helpful. Increasing the procurement of commercially produced high-tech
products will strengthen the private-sector base
for innovation.
The one area where some additional government spending is justified is research, especially basic research. Because so much of the
results show up in the open literature, the firms
doing and paying for the work rarely have
rights to the knowledge being generated. Yet
society as a whole benefits substantially. Under the circumstances, universities, research institutes, and civilian government agencies need
to be encouraged to fill the funding gap opened
by defense budget reductions.
6

A major decline in the size of the military

market is the proper time to administer a
massive dose of deregulation to the
military procurement process.
How do we do that without massive subsidies?
The Congressional Joint Economic
Committee held a hearing in September 1991
on proposals to do just that. I repeated my
standard advice to Capitol Hill, "Don't just
stand there, undo something. " It is ironic that
Congress continues to tighten its regulation of
defense companies, and of business generally,
just as Eastern European nations throw off the
shackles of governmental controls so that they
can move closer to that free economy that they
associate with the United States.
The sad fact is that American business, military and civilian, is faced with a major expansion of expensive and burdensome regulatory
legislation. A major decline in the size of the
military market is the proper time to administer
a massive dose of deregulation to the military
procurement process. That would reduce the
overhead costs of defense contractors. It would
also increase their ability to transfer new technology between civilian and military products.
Congress should strip out the host of special
provisions that require military contractors to
act more like government bureaus doling out
benefits to designated classes of beneficiaries
than private enterprises that are expected to
provide innovation and technological progress.
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As an alumnus of the military-industrial
complex, I feel obliged to report that the Pentagon is the place where Franz Kafka meets
Alice in Wonderland. For sugar cookies, military specifications run to fifteen pages. For a
cargo plane, companies vying for a contract
wrote a total of 240,000 pages of material weighing three-and-a-half tons.
Piecemeal procurement changes have failed.
The place to start is a sweeping overhaul of the
entire process. The Pentagon should eliminate
the 2,000 pages of existing procurement regulations, including 500 pages of standard clauses
and the 300 pages of forms.
Review authority over procurement programs (mainly to say no) is dispersed among 40
contract officers, staff experts, senior military
executives, auditors and inspectors. None of
these "second guessers" has responsibility for
the program's success and most of these positions should be eliminated.
Comprehensive reform means dividing military procurement into two categories: items
available in the private sector and weapons.
The great majority of military purchases should
be made without all the rigamarole.
The nation pays for bureaucratic wheelspinning in many ways - such as unnecessary delay. As a result, 8-12 years are now required
to develop and produce a new military aircraft.
Not surprisingly, much of the equipment is out
of date before the plane goes into use. The
Pentagon should award the contracts to the
firms that do well on earlier production programs - rather than those that are skillful at
drawing up proposals or merely "buying in" at
initial low prices.
Most important, we can raise the effectiveness of the money that is spent on military procurement by removing the myriad of restraints
and directives imposed by members of Congress anxious to protect the defense jobs located in their states or districts. Forcing the
military to buy weapons they do not need is the
most inefficient way of providing benefits to
constituents. It sets the wrong tone for all that
8

follows. After all, how can the people responsible for military acquisition be expected to
follow the highest ethical principles when the
entire process is designed by members of
Congress who treat the military budget as the
nation's biggest pork barrel?
Defense Companies Must Downsize
Defense companies need to continue the
substantial and painful downsizing now underway. They must maintain the financial ability
to operate in a different market environment or they will go under.
Most economic conversion proposals, sad to
say are characterized by naivete and wishful
thi~ing. At best they are a diversion. At
worst, they will dissipate the remaining assets
of defense contractors. The numerous past attempts by defense contractors to use their factories and people to penetrate civilian markets
have resulted in few successes. The abandoned
projects literally run the gamut from canoes to
coffins. Most of the undertakings have failed,
either being closed down or sold at a loss. Defense companies are different from civilian
companies. Procter & Gamble cannot make
missiles and General Dynamics cannot produce
soap or potato chips (at least not at competitive
prices).
Trying to get commercial payoffs from military technology is invariably an enticing concept. But the past sad history of the attempts
of the major military contractors to enter commercial markets underscores the need for government to refrain from trying to forcefeed that
process.
Individual defense firms need to understand
that like companies in other industries, they
hav~ no particular claim to maintaining their
present size, or even to their continued existence - nor do their employees possess any
special rights to the jobs now generated .by defense spending. Most of these firms wtll find
that a more modest scale of operations is also a
more efficient scale in the decade ahead.
This advice is consistent with the response
of the chairman of Martin Marietta when asked
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by the Soviets how to convert a tank plant into
a refrigerator factory: tear down the tank plant
and build a new refrigerator factory.

The federal government should focus on
developing sensible monetary and fiscal
policy and reducing tax and regulatory
obstacles to economic activity.
Forcing defense contractors to try to penetrate markets that are alien to them is no favor
to their employees who would find
themselves abruptly laid off when those
ventures visibly failed. Those now out of work
are better advised to seek employment
elsewhere.
It is foolhardy to ignore the
evidence. As a typical study of past experience
by Battelle Memorial Institute concluded:
"Detailed research has not identified even one
successful product in our economy today which
was developed through a military-to-civilian
conversion approach."

tion of business income falls on the individuals
directly affected. Given the incentives (positive
and negative) provided by the marketplace,
those adjustments will best be made if that basic responsibility is not shifted to someone else.
The best national economic policy to accompany future reductions in defense spending
is for the federal government to focus on the
important responsibilities which are uniquely
its own - developing sensible monetary and
fiscal policy and reducing tax and regulatory
obstacles to economic activity.
Erecting that appropriate economic framework is challenging in itself. Moreover, it creates the conditions that make it possible to
achieve a truly meaningful peace dividend.
After all, the real peace dividend is n?t ~~ly .a
matter of changing federal budget pnonttes; 1t
will occur when individual workers, companies, and communities successfully shift from
military to civilian activity.
The basic lesson that the nation learned after
World War II, Korea, and Vietnam is still pertinent: Once the federal government erects an
adequate framework in terms of a growing
economy with expanding job opportunities, it
should get out of the way!

Conclusion
The American economy can adjust successfully to the defense cutbacks likely to occur in
the 1990s. Defense is a minor player in the
overall American economy. It accounts for
one-fifteenth of the GNP and an even smaller
portion of the work force. Economic activity
in the U.S. marches to the beat of civilian
drummers.
Key economic changes will occur in the private sector as people and capital move from
military to civilian production. The major defense contractors face a reduction of about onethird from their present size.
In an economy such as that of the United
States, organized primarily along the lines of
private enterprise, the basic responsibility for
adjusting to losing a job or suffering a reduc10
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